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Case No. 87045)6
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vs.
RALPH L. WALKER,
Defendant/ Appellant.

REPLY TO PETITION FOR REHEARING
ON APPEAL FROM THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF
CACHE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
HONORABLE VeNOY CHRISTOFFERSEN
DISTRICT JUDGE

RALPH L. WALKER
8613 Woody Way
Highlands Ranch, Colorado 80126
Appellant Pro Se
(303) 791-8070

COOK & WILDE
ROBERT H. WILDE
6925 Union Park Center
Suite 490
Midvale, Utah 84047
(801) 255-6000
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
MONTY HIGLEY AND JONNIE
HIGLEY,

Case No. 87045
Plaintiffs/Respondents,
vs.

RALPH L. WALKER,
Defendant/ Appellant.
REPLY TO PETITION FOR REHEARING
BACKGROUND
This court granted Appellant's motion for summary reversal of
the trial court's denial of a motion to vacate. The respondent has
filed a petition for rehearing.
I.
THE RESPONDENT'S PETITION HAS NO MERIT
The petition violates Rule 35(a) of the Rules of Appellate
Procedure which states, •• Counsel for petitioner must certify that
the petition is presented

in good faith and not for delay."

counsel makes no such statement.
delay

and

to

cause

further

The petition has been filed for

damage

to

the

appellant.

The

Respondent's reply to the motion for summary reversal was a one
paragraph statement. Now after the court's ruling, counsel files
a 29 page petition for rehearing. This after Counsel in Bankruptcy
Court smugly admits that "the judgment entered on November 28, 1986
1

is void as to Walker."
The petition does not shed light on any new facts or law that
would ultimately change the court's decision.

He states that the

court can take judicial notice of the Bankruptcy proceeding to show
lack of notice to the Higleys but doesn't want the court to notice
the date of filing.

The Respondents have not offered any other

dates or challenged the date of filing only stated that the date
is not a fact before this court. The date of the entry of judgment
is also undisputed. In the Respondent's Petition on page one line
four, he lists the date of judgment as November 28, 1986.

These

two dates are the basis for the summary reversal, the court lacked
jurisdiction and therefore the judgment entered was void.

The

Respondents have not offered one fact or applicable law or court
precedent that could possibly affect the outcome of this case. The
Respondents have filed this petition to delay and cause additional
damage to the appellant by delaying the reinstatement of the
appellant's real estate brokers license.

This petition is a

continuation of the bad faith and fraud the respondents have
brought on the court by dragging the bankruptcy, filed in 1986, on
as long as possible thereby inflicting the maximum amount of time
and pain to the appellant and his family.
II.
THE RECORD ON APPEAL CONTAINED THE CONTROLLING FACTS
AND THE DATES PERTINENT TO THIS CASE HAVE NEVER BEEN DISPUTED.
The facts that are necessary for the determination of this
case are 1) The date of the filing of chapter 7 bankruptcy and 2)

2

the date of the entry of judgment. Both dates are included in the
docketing statement, the motion for summary reversal, and the
affidavit of Ralph L. Walker.

The dates are part of the court

record and certified copies are part of the affidavit.

The one

paragraph response from the respondent in opposition to the motion
for summary reversal did not offer any other dates or claim that
the dates were in error. The court can take judicial notice of the
date of the entry of the judgment November 28, 1986.

The filing

of the bankruptcy was November 21, 1986, no evidence has been
offered challenging the date of the filing and a certified copy of
the filing is part of the court
L. Walker.

record in the affidavit of Ralph

The respondents have attempted to make an issue of

whether the Higleys received notice of the filing and whether the
Higleys violated the automatic stay imposed by the filing
bankruptcy.

The

Higleys

bankruptcy is irrelevant.

alleged

lack

of

knowledge

of

of
the

The issue is whether the court had

jurisdiction to enter the judgment.
III.
THE JUDGMENT ENTERED SIX DAYS AFTER THE FILING OF BANKRUPTCY
IS VOID AS THE COURT HAD NO JURISDICTION.

1.

Federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction of all

matters and proceedings in bankruptcy, 28 U.S.C. 1334.

The state

court has NO jurisdiction.
In addition to the very broad grant of jurisdiction in 28
U.S.C. 1334(a) and (b), section 1334(d) provides in particular
that " The district court in which a case under title 11 is
commenced or is pending shall have exclusive jurisdiction of
all of the property, wherever located, of the debtor as of the
3

commencement of the case, and of property of the estate." The
stay power and the automatic stay will not be limited by any
concept of sovereign immunity.
The power of the bankruptcy court under section 105 to enjoin
litigation which seeks to obtain a judgement against the
estate or to interfere with property of the debtor has been
long recognized. Collier on Bankruptcy Paragraph 362,02
The automatic stay imposed by the filing of bankruptcy is
extremely broad in scope and applies to any type of formal or
informal action against the debtor.
entities, including state courts.

The stay applies to all

Subsection 362 (a)(1) of the

bankruptcy code provides for a broad stay of litigation against
the debtor and includes administrative, judicial, and other similar
proceedings.

Assoc, of St. Croix Condominium Owners v. St. Croix

Hotel Corp., 682 F.2d 446. 7 C.B.C.2d 137
The stay is effective upon the date of the filing of the
petition and formal service of process is not required.

Mueller

v.Nugent, 184 U.S. 1,22 S. CT. (1901) , however notice was given
both the court and the plaintiff before the trial started, later
in the objection to the findings of fact and conclusions of law,
and through the listings of the creditors on the appropriate
schedules of the chapter 7 filing.
POINT IV.
THE JUDGEMENT ENTERED AGAINST THE DEFENDANT IS VOID
The trial court lacked jurisdiction over the defendant after
November 21, 1986 and therefore the entry of judgement on November
28, 1986 was void.

In Brimhall v. Meacham 27 Utah 2d 222, 494 P2d

525 (1972) the court held that
A judgement is void only if the court which rendered it lacked
4

jurisdiction of the subject matter or of the parties, or if
it acted in a manner inconsistent with due process of law.
The court did lack jurisdiction as the defendant was under the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal Bankruptcy Court.

V.
THE RESPONDENT'S ACTIONS AFTER ENTRY OF JUDGMENT ARE NOT
BEFORE THIS COURT.
The Respondents have tried to confuse the issue before this
court by justifying their actions to collect from the recovery
fund.

The issue before this court is whether the trial court had

jurisdiction to enter the judgment. The actions of the Respondents
to collect from the recovery fund on a void judgment were improper.
The respondents claim that the actions were proper because it was
not against the appellant but against a third party. The judgment
is void to all the world not just to Walker. The real estate
recovery fund was not a quasi - defendant and if the judgment is
void as to Walker how can it have any validity before the recovery
fund.

The issue is brought only to confuse the relevant issue of

whether the trial court had jurisdiction which it clearly did not.

VI.
VACATION OF THE VOID JUDGMENT IS PROPER.
In the Respondents conclusion he states

ff

If the judgment is

to be voided he must follow proper procedure in the Bankruptcy
Court." This is ludicrous. The void judgment was entered in state
5

court, a request to vacate in state court is proper where the state
court lacked jurisdiction. The action the Respondents refer to in
the bankruptcy court is a complaint for damages for violating the
automatic stay.

The issue in that case is not whether there was

a violation of the stay but whether the violation was willful and
what were the damages suffered.

The appellant is entitled to the

relief sought, to have the judgment vacated.

CONCLUSION
The controlling facts in this case are the two dates, the
filing of the bankruptcy and the entry of the judgment.

These

dates are November 21, 1986 and November 28, 1986 respectively.
These dates are not disputed and

are part of the record.

Since

the entry of judgment occurred after the filing of the bankruptcy
the judgment is void.
Summary Reversal

in this action

is appropriate

and the

petition for rehearing should be denied as it does not meet the
requirements of Rule 35(a) and is meritless.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED
Dated this

day of June , 1988

Ralph L. Walker, pro se
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed four true and correct copies
of the above and foregoing REPLY TO PETITION FOR REHEARING to
Robert H. Wilde 6925 Union Blvd., Midvale Utah 84947 this
of June, 1988.

Ralph L. Walker

7

day

